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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we explore theories of opportunity discovery/creation with reference to the 
research, development and commercialization process of disruptive innovations. We 
apply this distinction (and inferences drawn in prior literature) to a number of cases of 
disruptive innovation (DI), using both known and new examples from mature and 
emerging markets.  We find that the features of opportunity discovery and creation are 
too closely connected to be separable among the innovations studied. This leads us to 
question the theoretical basis of this distinction and to revisit earlier theories of 
entrepreneurship for an account of the way entrepreneurs innovate both in their use of 
means and in their choice of ends, as supported by our evidence on disruptive innovations. 
The aim of the paper  is to clarify both the nature of disruptive innovations and the 
generation of opportunities. 
 
 
Keywords:  Opportunity discovery, Opportunity creation, Disruptive innovation, 
Entrepreneurship 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
An entrepreneurial opportunity has been defined as a situation “in which new goods, 
services, raw materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced through the 
formation of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships” (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003: 
p.336). Although the concept of opportunity is core to the theories of entrepreneurship 
and economics, the fundamental source of opportunity remains an on-going debate 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Dutta and Crossan, 2005; Gartner et al., 2003). While one 
stream of research indicates that opportunities exist as a result of market disequilibria and 
therefore can be “discovered” by people who are particularly alert to opportunities (i.e. 
entrepreneurs) (e.g. Kaisch & Gilad, 1991; Kirzner, 1973, 1979; Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000), the other research stream asserts that initiatives by entrepreneurs are crucial to the 
emergence of opportunity and it is the entrepreneurs who “create” the opportunities (e.g. 
Gartner 1985; Sarasvathy, 2001; Shumpeter 1934; Weick, 1979). Three fundamental 
differences in the assumptions underlying the two views were summarized by Alvarez 
and Barney (2007) who infer contrasting practical implications for each. They argued that 
the perceived context of the entrepreneurs, whether of discovery or creation, would 
determine the effectiveness of the actions taken by entrepreneurs.  
This dichotomous view of the nature of opportunities for entrepreneurs has seldom been 
challenged in the expanding literature on this topic.  In this paper, we revisit some earlier 
theories of entrepreneurship (Freeman, 1984; Penrose, 1959; Stevenson, 2006) and take 
into account the theory of effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001) to explore whether opportunity 
discovery and creation are separable processes in entrepreneurship. We examine relevant 
evidence by applying the distinctions made by Alvarez and Barney to six cases of 
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disruptive innovation. We show that all entrepreneurs acted in ways that involved both 
the discovery and to the creation of opportunities, although some cases feature more 
attributes associated with one process rather than the other by Alvarez and Barney. This 
exercise proves useful in clarifying the nature of opportunities for disruptive innovation 
and the possibilities for purposive innovations of a disruptive kind. 
Disruptive innovation (DI) is a process by which a product or service takes root initially 
in simple applications at the bottom of a market or in a new market, and then relentlessly 
moves ‘up market’, eventually displacing established competitors. The term was coined 
by Christensen in his seminal publications in the late 90s and the phenomenon has 
attracted attention by both scholars and practitioners (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & 
Lindsay & Hopkins, 2010; Linton, 2004; Raynor, 2003). Theory of disruptive innovation 
has also been extended from its original formulation to a more general strategy for market 
expansion (Utterback & Acee, 2005). Although Christensen maintains that the theory of 
DI can be used to predict the trend or next generation disruption (Christensen, 2006; Yu 
& Hang, 2010), this has been disputed (Kostoff, et al., 2004; Tellis, 2006). By applying 
theories of opportunity to cases of DI, we show in this paper how technological 
disruptive innovations were carved out by the entrepreneurs through processes combining 
opportunity discovery and creation.  This points to the potential for disruptive 
innovations of a purposive kind undertaken by entrepreneurs who recognize possibilities 
for DI and take effective action to exploit such opportunities. 
In the following section, we briefly review two theories of opportunity and the 
comparison summarized in Alvarez and Barney (2007) and contrast underlying theories 
with some earlier concepts of entrepreneurship and with effectuation theory. The 
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methodology of the research reported here and the case analyses are presented. We go on 
to apply the distinction made by Alvarez and Barney to the cases of DI to see whether the 
evidence supports their framework. We discuss the findings of this study and conclude 
with recommendations for practice. 
2. OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY AND CREATION 
The debate on whether opportunity is discovered or created originated in differences 
between the views of Schumpeter (1934) and Kirzner (1979). Schumpeter believed that 
exogenous shocks such as technological, demographic, and social changes disrupt market 
efficiency and entrepreneurs make use of their early access to such information to create 
new products, services or processes. Kirzner held that market disequilibrium persists as a 
result of the idiosyncratic and incomplete information held by individuals; accordingly, 
those who are alert to the market disequilibrium can develop a profitable new product or 
service, bringing prices back to market equilibrium. On the basis of these two theories, 
two streams of research on opportunity emerged.  
The Kirznerian stream (or opportunity discovery stream) is better populated in the 
entrepreneurship literature (Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Shane & Venkataraman, 2003). 
Researchers in this stream focus on the “search” process to improve market inefficiency 
set off by information and knowledge asymmetry. They attribute the ability to recognize 
such information and overcome knowledge asymmetry to personal factors such as 
personality traits (Rauch & Frese, 2007), prior experience (Shane, 2000), motivation 
(Locke & Baum, 2007; Shane, et al., 2003), and cognitions (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). 
Researchers in the Schumpeterian stream (or opportunity creation stream) focus on the 
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way entrepreneurs enact opportunities in response to technological, political, regulatory, 
social, and demographic changes (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Gartner, 1985; Gartner, et al., 
2003; Sarasvathy, 2001).  
Barney and Alvarez (2007) argue that the two streams of research differ in their basic 
assumptions and yield different implications for opportunity identification and 
exploitation. They also identify three dimensions of difference in the assumptions of the 
two theories: 1) nature of opportunities; 2) nature of entrepreneurs; and 3) nature of the 
decision making context. They maintain that the discovery theory assumes that an 
opportunity exists independently of entrepreneurs, who ex ante differ in some important 
ways from non-entrepreneurs, and that the decision-making context is subject to risk, 
which (unlike uncertainty) can be calculated. They see this as implying that decision-
makers can access information to anticipate possible outcomes and their probability. The 
opportunity creation theory, in contrast, assumes that an opportunity emerges along with 
the entrepreneurs’ perceptions. The decision making context is uncertain so information 
needed to anticipate possible outcomes or their probability is unavailable. 
Barney and Alveraz (2007) discuss seven implications of these two sets of assumptions - 
in the areas of leadership, decision making, human resource practices, strategy, finance, 
marketing, and sustaining competitive advantages. In the theory of discovery 
opportunities occur in pre-existing markets and their identification relies on the 
entrepreneur’s prior knowledge or experience. The context of discovery is subject to 
calculable risk and information is available for prediction and risk control, making it 
possible to anticipate skill requirements.  Such information also supports relatively 
complete and long-term strategies, the attraction of external funding and specification of 
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their marketing mix. However, once information about the opportunity is made public by 
the entrepreneur’s actions, competitive imitation will soon follow. Hence to protect a new 
business the entrepreneur needs to achieve speed to market, maintain secrecy and erect 
other entry barriers. 
In contrast, these authors see the theory of opportunity creation as assuming no pre-
existing market inefficiency to be remedied. Thus entrepreneurs rely on their experience 
to detect a latent need and translate this into effective demand for their innovation. They 
draw on their charisma to evoke trust. Unable to predict the future, these entrepreneurs 
make decisions on an iterative, inductive, and incremental basis and engage in emergent 
and flexible strategy-making.   They recruit general and flexible human capital, usually 
from their current social network, and raise funds informally. There is no pre-existing 
model of marketing; this emerges as part of the opportunity creation process. Finally, 
their competitive advantage lies in creating a unique business, which is hard to imitate 
and hence can be sustained by tacit knowledge and path-dependent learning.   
With regard to some earlier concepts of entrepreneurship, the distinction made by Barney 
and Alvarez is consistent with the work of Sarasvathy (2001), on which Fisher (2012) 
also relies.  The attributes Barney and Alvarez assign to opportunity recognition align 
with what Sarasvathy describes as a classic causation theory of entrepreneurship, while 
their account of opportunity creation aligns with Sarasvathy’s effectuation approach. This 
approach involves “eliminating the assumption of preexisting goals.” (Sarasvathy, 2001) 
held by entrepreneurs, who instead use the means available to them in pursuing 
opportunities in a creative and flexible way. A similar approach to means is taken in the 
theory of entrepreneurial bricolage, whereby entrepreneurs make do with available 
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resources in pursuing opportunities (Baker & Nelson, 2005). In contrast, entrepreneurs 
who engage in classic entrepreneurship based on causation premises are said to focus on 
‘selecting between means’ to realize a given opportunity (Sarasvathy, 2001). This is a 
rational planning approach, which has been summarized for entrepreneurial startups as 
follows: “Some individuals are in a unique position to discover opportunities. Once an 
opportunity has been discovered [emphasis added], the potential entrepreneur assesses 
the commercial potential of the idea and” [depending on contingencies] “decides whether 
or not to start a venture. Investments and [preparatory] actions… follow the firm 
formation decision. Next a set of strategic choices is made covering the business model, 
partnerships, pricing and product line among others. After product launch, consumer 
demand [provides] feedback on its idea and enabling adjustments” (Shah & Tripsas, 
2007). 
Thus the rational planning approach has been depicted as the classic approach to 
entrepreneurial decision making by Sarasvathy (2001), by Shah and Tripsas (2007) and 
by Fisher (2012) among others. However there are earlier approaches to entrepreneurial 
decision-making that pre-date and differ from those presented by these authors, but could 
also be characterized as classic approaches to entrepreneurship. The definition of 
opportunity we provided initially characterized a situation in which innovations are 
introduced “through the formation of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships” 
(Eckhardt & Shane, 2003).   This is implicit in classic writings by Penrose (1960) and 
Freeman (1982) who saw that entrepreneurial innovation involves a new matching of 
resources to opportunities, that is, a new configuration of means and ends. Penrose 
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detected this from the perspective of the entrepreneurial firm (Penrose, 1959) while 
Freeman’s focus was on sources of innovation.  
‘Means’ in Sarasvathy’s analysis is a conceptualization of entrepreneurs’ personal ‘assets’ 
based on who entrepreneurs are, what they know, and who they know. Fisher interprets 
means in Sarasvathy’s analysis of effectuation as proceeding from what is given: 
‘  “things over which the entrepreneur has control” - in particular knowledge, networks 
and resources’ (Fisher, 2012).  In complete contrast is an earlier definition of 
entrepreneurship as ‘the pursuit of opportunity without regards to resources currently 
controlled.” (Stevenson, 2006). It was based on extensive studies by Howard Stevenson, 
a pioneer in entrepreneurship studies. The rational planning approach was attributed by 
Stevenson not to entrepreneurs but to corporate managers who receive budgetary 
allocation of the resources needed to achieve approved objectives. While Stevenson 
recognized that rational planning methods could be, and are, applied in start ups, he did 
not see these methods as being classically entrepreneurial. Rather they implied attempts 
to use corporate rational planning methods in startup companies.  
Thus pre-dating the two theories of entrepreneurship used by Barney and Alvarez, we 
find that earlier theories of entrepreneurship made a different contrast.  Earlier writers 
compared managers who plan from the outset to achieve given ends by using rational 
planning with typically entrepreneurial innovators who configure new means-ends 
relationship in flexible and creative ways - through a shift in means, ends or both, 
typically pursuing opportunities before they have secured the necessary means to realize 
them. The approach of relevant authors is summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1  Dichotomous approaches to understand entrepreneurship 
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Authors Characterisation of Entrepreneurial Innovation 
(and contrast with other modes) 
Barney & Alvarez, 2007 
 
Opportunity discovery 
(Kirznerian view) 
Opportunity creation 
(Schumpeterian view) 
Sarasvathy, 2001 
 
Classic (Causation based) 
entrepreneurship: rational 
means used to achieve 
predetermined ends. 
Effectuation – use of 
given means to achieve 
flexible ends 
Shah & Tripsas, 2007 Classic entrepreneurship 
Rational means used to 
achieve predetermined 
ends. 
User entrepreneurship 
Collective creativity, 
experimentation, adaption 
of ideas. 
Eckhardt and Shane, 2003 
 
 Entrepreneurial 
opportunities 
Involve “new means, 
ends, or means-ends 
relationships”   
Stevenson and Jarillo 
2001; Stevenson 2006 
 
Rational corporate 
planning: select and 
secure appropriate means 
to achieve approved ends. 
Entrepreneurial 
improvisation to secure 
resources unavailable on 
initial pursuit of 
opportunity 
Penrose, 1959; 1960; 
1971 
Corporate planning: 
selected means to achieve 
approved ends. 
Entrepreneurs engage in 
creative matching of 
resources (means) to 
market opportunities. 
Freeman,  1982  Freeman disputed that 
innovation results 
exclusively from 
technology or market 
impetus. 
Entrepreneurial   
innovation via matching 
of technological means to 
market opportunities.   
 
In order to explore which theories of entrepreneurship best fit evidence on disruptive 
innovation, we set out to obtain relevant evidence from six cases of disruptive innovation. 
3. METHOD 
In comparing two different theoretical explanations of the opportunity emerging process, 
we followed the approach set out by Fisher (2012) of an alternative template research 
design (Langley, 1999) and applied the two theoretical perspectives discussed above to 
evidence from cases of disruptive innovation. We chose two earlier cases of disruptive 
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innovation (DI) (i.e. Seagate and Sony) and four relatively new cases from emerging 
sectors and markets (i.e. Suzlon, Luyuan, Tata swach, and ARM). For each case of 
disruptive innovation, we used not only published information, but also multiple 
interviews, conducted with the company founder and senior scientist or engineer in order 
to understand the R&D background and commercialization of the innovation. This makes 
it possible to triangulate information for each case, increasing the validity of the findings. 
The details on the cases and the data collected are reported in Table 2. 
We compared the evidence from each case to the contrast theorized by Alveraz and 
Barney (2007). If the qualitative data in the case study matches the assumption or the 
inferred actions associated with the theory, we take this to show that the theory is a good 
fit in explaining the formation of the opportunity. The strength of the fit between the data 
and the theory is assessed by two criteria: 1) is it clear that the evidence on a specific 
assumption or action fits the theory? 2) Is the data in the case study clear and from 
multiple sources and unlikely to be contested by others reading the same information? 
4. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION CASES 
4.1 Seagate  
Seagate Technology pioneered the development of 5.25 inch hard disc drive in 1980 
(Christensen, 1997). The 5.25-inch drives’ capacities of 5 and 10 MB were of no interest 
to minicomputer manufacturers, who were demanding drives of 40 and 60 MB from their 
suppliers. In fact, except for their lower price and smaller sizes compared with the 
mainstream 8-inch drives, the 5.25-inch drives were inferior in all major performance 
aspects (i.e. storage capacity, average positioning time, average access time, and data 
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transfer rate). Instead of simply giving up, Seagate chose to create new applications for 
their products by reconfiguring conventional Winchester technology into a package size 
that could compete with 5.25” floppy disk. The use of hard drives became established in 
the desktop PC applications where small size, light weight, use of internal power supply 
and low cost unit were highly valued. Gradually, the capacity was increased to the level 
that was good enough for minicomputer and even mainframe markets. In this way the 
disruption took place and the 5.25” disk manufacturers became the new generation 
leaders. 
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Table 2 Description of the cases and the number of interviews conducted 
Case Seagate Sony Luyuan  Suzlon Tata Swach ARM  
Country U.S. Japan China India India E.U.| 
Founders A. Shugart, 
T Mitchell, 
D.Mahon, F. 
Conner and 
S. Iftikar 
Masaru 
Ibuka and 
Akio Morita 
Ni Jie and 
Hu Jihong 
Tulsi Tanti 
another 
founder is 
referred to in 
the case 
description –
operations 
manager 
Ratan Tata 12 engineers 
from Acorn 
Computers, 
Robin  
Saxby, 
Hermann 
Hauser 
Year founded 1979 1946 1997 1995 2009 1990 
Disruptive 
innovation 
5.25-inch 
hard disc 
drive 
Pocket 
transistor 
radio 
Electric bike Wind 
turbine and 
solutions 
Water 
purifier 
RISC  Chip 
requiring 
low power 
Interviews 3 1 3 4 2 8 
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Compared with other 5.25” producers, Seagate was extremely successful in establishing 
low-cost, high-quality manufacturing capacity, and in improving the speed and reliability 
of its 5.25 inch drives. An extensive marketing campaign and early success in obtaining 
licensing agreements from major firms such as Texas Instruments and Cii-Honeywell 
Bull led to the Seagate drive and interface ST506 and ST412 being recognized as defacto 
standards in the industry. The small company won contracts from IBM to supply disk 
drives for the IBM PC-2 and later PC/XT. Seagate knew that IBM and other computer 
manufacturers would press relentlessly for lower disk drive prices in exchange for the 
promise of future orders for the rapidly growing PC market. In 1982, three years from 
startup, Seagate began to assemble HDD components in Singapore, becoming the first 
firm in the industry to do so. Seagate became the world’s largest disk drive producer, 
reducing its costs on the basis of its Southeast Asian production base, in time for the 
fierce price competition in the subsequent years.  
4.2 Sony  
In the 1950s, the early transistor radios offered only poor performance and far lower 
fidelity than the vacuum tube-based tabletop radios. Nevertheless, Sony discovered a 
teenage market in the US that valued the pocket size and low price of transistor-based 
radios. This enabled teenagers to listen to Rock'n'Roll beyond their parents' earshot, 
though the music quality could not compete with tabletop radios (Morita et al., 1987).  
Masaru Ibuka, one of the two founders of Sony signed an agreement with Western 
Electric to manufacture the transistor. But this agreement did not cover the technology 
and further R&D required to design and build a commercial portable transistor radio, 
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which became the responsibility of Sony engineers. First, with extensive research, they 
discovered that replacing the positive-negative-positive configuration to negative-
positive-negative yielded a higher frequency response; but they could not find the 
appropriate material for this purpose. Although Bell Labs had failed at using phosphorus 
to replace antimony, Sony engineers persisted and eventually found a phosphorus doping 
method. Second, they had to redesign many electronic circuits to achieve low-power 
consumption. Third, in order to fit other electronics components into their small radio, 
almost every component needed to be miniaturized including the capacitor, the 
transformer, and the battery. Ibuka visited many component manufacturers in Japan and 
persuaded them to miniaturize each component from scratch. Fourth, to reduce the 
manufacturing cost, Sony designed and made their own printed circuit boards. Akio 
Morita, the other founder of Sony then decided on the US as their first target market, 
because Japan still lacked consumer demand for such a high-tech product.   
Through its effective pursuit of miniaturization and compactness, within 3 years Sony 
introduced the world’s first pocket transistor radio, in 1957. Starting with the transistor 
radio, Sony established unique core competence in product miniaturization which helped 
Sony to become a successful electronic business leader.  
4.3 Suzlon  
Suzlon, India’s major wind power provider has become the world’s fifth largest wind 
turbine manufacturer with a market share of 7.6%. Suzlon’s founder, Tulsi Tanti, moved 
into the wind power business by chance. Unhappy with the erratic power supplies and 
rising energy costs at his textile mill in Gujarat, India, Tanti decided to give wind energy 
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a try. In the early 1990s, there was no wind energy developer in India. Tanti assembled 
his own team of four engineers from the textile plant and arranged for them to visit the 
existing wind farms in India for a month. Then they identified the vendors and equipment 
suppliers needed to build and install the first two wind turbines. 
Tanti soon discovered that although the wind turbines could not provide the capacity of 
conventional power generators, they provided a reliable and cheaper source of energy. 
They were also environmentally friendly. Discovering this business potential, he made a 
bold decision to exit his textile business and set up Suzlon Energy in 1995 with a modest 
capital of $600,000. Suzlon’s strategy has been to capitalize on India’s low 
manufacturing costs and provide end-to-end customized solutions at affordable prices to 
its Indian industrial clients. From the outset, Tanti aimed to build a vertically integrated 
business – integrating every process in-house (i.e. R&D, manufacturing, installation, 
service, etc.) - so that he could better control the cost and collect feedback. After an 
extensive search, Tanti identified one small German company, Suedwind, which was 
willing to sell its technology for $1 million. Suzlon obtained ten turbines from 
Suedwind’s inventory, and assembled the turbines with the help of the German engineers 
alongside their own two turbines. When Suedwind folded in 1997, due to financial 
difficulties, Suzlon bought it, retaining its R&D center and turbine manufacturing 
facilities in Germany. Shortly after, Suzlon acquired a rotor-blade manufacturer in the 
Netherlands; the acquisitions broadened Suzlon’s reach, bringing a product range that 
included wind turbine generators in capacities from 350 KW to 2.1 MW with customized 
versions suitable for a variety of climates. In 2006, Suzlon acquired Hansen Transmission 
International – a world leading manufacturer of gearbox and drive trains for wind 
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turbines. In 2007, Suzlon acquired Repower Systems AG, a technology leader of multi-
megawatt wind turbines.  Leveraging R&D capabilities in Europe and low cost 
manufacturing capabilities in Asia, Suzlon managed to bring down the cost of their wind 
turbines to 20% below their European competitors. Meanwhile, their installation time 
was shorter and maintenance cost was lower than their competitors’.  
All along, Tanti had very clear vision for his company: to bring down the cost of power 
to below that of gas. Suzlon’s R&D, and strategy were designed for this purpose. 
Suzlon’s products soon attracted customers with large manufacturing operations in rural 
areas that had poor or costly access to conventional power supplies.  Suzlon’s business 
grew rapidly in India and worldwide.  
4.4 Luyuan  
Beginning in mid-90s, a few visionary Chinese companies like Luyuan started to build a 
product which could better meet the daily transportation needs of the growing urban 
Chinese population. Although companies like Yamaha had already released E-bikes in 
the Japanese market, they were too expensive for the Chinese customers at that time. 
Reverse-engineering an existing E-bike model, the founders of Luyuan built their first 
generation E-bikes with motors, lead-acid batteries, battery chargers, and controllers in 
1996. As most of the key components of the E-bike were available from suppliers in the 
market, Luyuan’s assembled E-bikes were much cheaper than the Yamahas, although 
their performance was compromised. Nevertheless, due to its affordability and ease of 
use, Luyuan’s E-bikes gradually attracted older customers and young mothers who used 
the bikes to take their children to school.  
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Luyuan’s initial business model which heavily relied on outsourcing the component 
manufacturing was challenged in 1999 by a large-scale battery crisis. Over 3000 batteries 
broke down just within 3 months (the life expectancy is normally 2~3 years), and 
customers were furious. When Luyuan informed the battery supplier about the quality 
problem, the supplier refused to take responsibility to solve the problem and rejected all 
the returns. Facing double attacks from both customers and suppliers, Luyuan was on the 
brink of bankruptcy. Ni Jie, the founder and the Chairman of Luyuan realized that it was 
vital to advance the key technologies and secure the supply of the battery. He recalled all 
the problematic E-bikes and actively responded to the litigation raised by the supplier. He 
also published many articles in a well regarded journal in China known as Battery. He 
devoted much time to presenting his papers in annual meetings of battery associations, 
inviting firms specialized in batteries to participate in electric bike industry. These 
actions helped to eliminate the possibility of future battery crises. Moreover, he initiated 
the setting up of the national standard for E-bike batteries which took into effect in 2001.   
Luyuan also took part in specifying the National Standards of General Technical 
Requirements of Electric Bicycles (National Standard GB1776 -1999), which was 
formally launched in 1999. Accordingly, when R&D efforts resulted in key technology 
advancements which significantly improved the E-bike performance, Luyuan was among 
the first to embrace them. When SARS broke out in China in 2003 and many people tried 
to avoid public transportation, Luyuan’s business took off and the whole E-bike industry 
expanded exponentially in China. In 2008, Luyuan set up its own battery company called 
Green Power, and in 2009, Luyuan launched a new production base in Shandong, 
expanding the annual production capacity up to 1 million E-bikes. Luyuan continued to 
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lead the industry, not only by means of its R&D capabilities but also through its lean 
production, nation-wide exclusive distribution system, and reliable after-sales service.  
4.5 Tata Swach 
The idea of Tata Swach came from a research result dated back in the 1980s, which 
showed that the rice husk ashes (RHA) could remove visible particles in water. In 2005 
this idea was used in Sujaal water purifier -- one of Tata’s corporate social risk projects 
during the tsunami rescue. In 2009, Ratan Tata (Tata’s chairman) decided to make a 
water purifier at the price of Rs1000. At that time only less than 5% of urban Indian 
families and 1% of rural Indian families used water purifiers as the available products 
priced above Rs2000 were not affordable. Tata’s vision for Swach was a mobile compact 
product, running without electricity or running water, without harmful chemicals in the 
long run, eliminating water-borne diseases and its performance should meet the 
international standard.  
Tata Sujaal’s unique RHA is a natural low-cost and durable substitute for the prevalent 
water purification material (i.e. carbon or silica). But RHA could not remove micro-
organism in the water to meet the international standard. Silver in India is known as a 
micro-biocide, but regular use of silver is costly and not good for health. Hence the 
scientists in Tata Chemical “nanoed” silver by using their existing technologies. 
Combining RHA with nano-silver, the purification finally met the standard. As their 
target customers were people who only store water for some time to let the dusk sink 
before use, the original idea was to sell the purification bulb itself and let people use it in 
their own water container. But after a six-month market test, they found that people 
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expected a holistic “high-tech” product (water purifier) instead of the bulb. Hence they 
found a low cost substitute for the plastics needed to make the containers.  
In 2009, when Tata Swach launched its water at the price of Rs899, there was no 
competition at all. Since then, many competitors entered this segment. But thanks to its 
patented RHA and nano-silver technologies, Tata Swach remains the market leader.  
4.6 ARM 
When Acorn Computers, based in Cambridge UK, needed 16 or 32 bit microprocessors 
for their PC products, they were dissatisfied with those available on the market.  They 
found that the Berkeley Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) chip design could 
bypass many problems involved in standard chip design. They decided to “have a go at 
building such a microprocessor” (The Guardian, 08/03/2001).   The only way they could 
do this with the limited resources at their disposal was by keeping it very simple. The 
Acorn RISC Machine (ARM) CPU was of very small size, designed with few transistors 
and extremely low power consumption. These attributes turned out to be of great value in 
the emerging mobile device market (Sapsed, 1999).  
In 1985, a joint venture, ARM, was formed between Apple Computers and Acorn. 
Initially this was to develop a microprocessor for Apple Computer’s Newton Notepad.  
When the Newton Notepad failed to gain market acceptance, the business model adopted 
for the new venture was significantly changed to designing a base technology and then 
licensing the intellectual property (ARM Annual Report, 2005).  Robin Saxby had been 
recruited as ARM’s first CEO from Motorola, where he had acquired extensive 
marketing expertise. This was combined with the advanced technical skills of the 12 
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engineers who moved to ARM from Acorn’s Advanced R&D department. Saxby proved 
to be a charismatic leader, who encouraged his engineers to develop skills in sales and 
customer support. 
Microprocessors which offered small size, lower cost and lower power consumption did 
not provide performance factors of interest in the PC sector.  For this reason Intel, for 
example, did not pursue this market. But ARM recognised that there were new customers 
who needed these performance factors in the emerging mobile device sectors. Not only 
did ARM identify this opportunity, they developed a new business model that created a 
new range of opportunities. While they had initially sub-contracted production of their 
chip design to VSLI, they chose to change direction and began to offer design and 
customer support services to customers in a wide range of sectors (Presentation by Robin 
Saxby 2008). When a then relatively unknown Finnish company, Nokia was seeking a 
CPU design for its mobile phone that would work reliably in the background, use 
minimum power, and be well supported with design tools, models and applications, ARM 
could readily meet its requirement. Building on this experience, ARM’s processor was 
developed as a programmable tool for other customers developing Complex Systems on 
Chips.ARM could offer customers the capability to customize their designs for low 
power-consumption chips for highly integrated applications such as cell phones, personal 
digital assistants, information appliances and other embedded systems.  This process was 
supported by the development of a distinctive IP centred business model.    This strategy 
enabled chips designed by ARM to quickly become the de facto global standard in 
embedded devices, and it has remained so to this day in high volume applications in the 
wireless, consumer electronics and networking markets.  
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5. RESULTS 
The overall results are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 below summarises our 
findings with regard to attributes of entrepreneurial behavior related to Opportunity 
Discovery and Table 4 summarises attributes related to Opportunity Creation.  The 
scoring of case attributes reflects the difficulty of assigning the cases to one or other 
category. For each case, some of the attributes appear to conform to those assigned by 
Barney and Alvarez to opportunity discovery - but the cases also have attributes that fit 
their category of opportunity creation. Thus the first finding of this study is that both 
opportunity discovery and opportunity creation strategies were used and in practice the 
distinction proposed by Barney and Alvarez (date) does not apply clearly to these cases. 
 From Table 3 we see that 38 of the scores for the case studies fit the attributes assigned 
to opportunity discovery, as against fewer than half as many attributes that do not fit.  
However this was not because the cases are well formulated in terms of opportunity 
discovery since in Table 4 we see that 36 of the scores also fit the attributes assigned to 
opportunity creation. Comparing the results of each case in Table 3 and those in Table 4, 
we found that Suzlon and Tata Swach have more attributes of opportunity discovery than 
opportunity creation, while Luyuan and ARM have more attributes of opportunity 
creation than opportunity discovery; the remaining cases (Sony and Seagate) show rather 
mixed results. We selected Suzlon and ARM case to illustrate our findings in more detail. 
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Table 3 Opportunity discovery in DI cases 
 Seagate Sony Suzlon Luyuan ARM Tata 
Swach
Total*
1. Nature of opportunities (Source of opportunities is information 
asymmetry) 
      42 
2. Nature of entrepreneurs (Different from non-entrepreneur, ex 
ante) 
      51 
3. Nature of decision making context (Risky)       24 
4. Leadership (Based on expertise and experience)       60 
5. Decision making (Risk-based data collection tools costs)       24 
6. HR practices (Specific human capital recruited broadly)    -   50 
7. Strategy (Relatively complete and unchanging)       33 
8. Finance (External capital sources: banks and venture capital 
firms) 
     - 32 
9. Marketing (Changes in marketing mix may be how new 
opportunities manifest themselves ) 
      42 
10. Sustaining competitive advantage (Speed, secrecy, and 
erecting barriers to entry may sustain advantages) 
      51 
Total* 73 64 91 36 64 90 3820
* The total number of  here only count the “” as one instead of two. 
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Table 4 Opportunity creation in DI cases 
 Seagate Sony Suzlon Luyuan ARM Tata 
Swach
Total*
1. Nature of opportunities (Source of opportunities is exogenous 
shocks) 
      33 
2. Nature of entrepreneurs (Different from non-entrepreneur, ex 
post) 
      24 
3. Nature of decision making context (Uncertain)       42 
4. Leadership (Based on charisma) -      50 
5. Decision making (Iterative, inductive, incremental decision 
making; use of biases and heuristics; importance of affordable 
loss) 
      42 
6. HR practices (General and flexible human capital recruited 
from pre-existing social networks) 
   -   32 
7. Strategy (Emergent and changing)       42 
8. Finance (“Bootstrapping” and “friends, family and fools”)     - - 13 
9. Marketing (Marketing mix may fundamentally change as a 
result of new opportunities that emerge ) 
      42 
10. Sustaining competitive advantage (Tacit learning in path 
dependent process may sustain advantages) 
      60 
Total* 63 73 37 81 90 36 3620
* The total number of  here only count the “” as one instead of two. 
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 In the case of Suzlon, the nature of the opportunity, the nature of the entrepreneur, and 
the nature of the decision making context appear to fit the opportunity discovery category. 
There was a clear market failure in the inadequacy of provision of conventional energy 
services in India at that time. In turning to wind energy Tanti was recognizing that the 
intermittency seen as a drawback to wind energy could not be worse than the power 
failures of the electric grid. He developed a clear vision for Suzlon – to supply and bring 
down the cost of power in India which was for him an entrepreneurial project from the 
start, and therefore denotes an ex ante entrepreneurial orientation.   The decision making 
context for the move from textile to wind turbine business was fraught with risk because 
Hence Tanti decided to adopt an “end-to-end solution” and vertically integrated the entire 
value chain from site location research to grid installation. Although Tanti had to 
leverage his own social network to draw in the first customer, potential market demand 
was predictable and the Indian government offered supportive schemes for renewable 
energy businesses. Tanti’s decision to enter into wind turbine business was based on well 
researched information and calculation of the risks which enabled him to know the 
required skill set and to hire specialist from Europe, another attribute of discovery. His 
vision and strategy were relatively complete and unchanging from the beginning – that is 
to use an acquisition strategy to integrate both the upstream and downstream businesses 
into one Suzlon kingdom.  Suzlon’s clear vision, business model, strategies helped it 
obtain external finance and achieve a successful IPO in 2005 (Vietor & Seminerio, 2008). 
Suzlon’s wind turbines, prices, value network, marketing and maintenance services 
constituted a unique package that met market demand in India and many other countries.  
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The case of Suzlon case fits the attributes assigned to opportunity discovery in 9 respects, 
but not as regards how they sustain their competitive advantage. What distinguish Suzlon 
from the others are low prices, rapid installation, cheap and reliable maintenance, most of 
which are based on tacit learning achieved with its international customers over time. The 
leadership style at Suzlon was partly based on expertise and experience (though not of the 
new activity) but also partly charismatic. There were important technical achievements in 
Suzlon’s turbines and extensive experience of turbine installation in various countries, 
according to the head of commissioning and global operations. At the same time, Tulsi 
Tanti’s leadership was charismatic in that he articulated a clear vision, understood how to 
sustain Suzlon’s competitive advantages and had insight into the future of the industry. 
Finally, Suzlon relied not only on specialist expertise from Germany, but also on general 
and flexible human capital recruited from pre-existing social networks including the 
engineers from Tanti’s textile factories.   In brief, we are not dealing with a clear cut case 
of opportunity discovery as summarized in Table 3, but nor does the case fit all the 
attributes of opportunity creation summarized in Table 4. 
For disruptive innovations that show strong attributes of opportunity creation, we turn to 
the case of ARM, which featured 9 attributes associated with opportunity creation in the 
taxonomy presented by Barney and Alvarez. In this case, opportunities were recognized 
largely as a result of special expertise in RISC chips, a technology well suited to the 
emerging mobile devices markets. Thus the case features information asymmetry. Their 
knowledge at ARM of the value of their low power RISC chip in the emerging market for 
embedded devices suggests a case of opportunity discovery. However in other respects 
we see active creation of opportunity aligned with the attributes summarized in Table 4. 
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The original founders became increasingly entrepreneurial as they proceeded, rather than 
being so ex ante, since they had been R&D engineers in the company from which ARM 
spun out. But the CEO who became a member of the founding team was from an 
established company (Motorola). He had the market insights and was different from non-
entrepreneurs ex ante. Hence the entrepreneurial team of ARM was a mix of both types 
of entrepreneurs. Opportunities were proactively created by the shift in strategy and 
development of an IP model that provided customer support as well as design services. 
The decision-making context was highly uncertain and incalculable and the leadership 
charismatic; this was the context resulting in a change of strategy. While the 12 engineers 
who originally helped to found ARM were specialists, they became generalists in 
learning sales skills and the CEO Saxby was a generalist. They pursued an economical 
business model to reduce reliance on venture capital; ARM, like Luyuan rapidly became 
revenue earning. They altered their market focus in response to the opportunities they 
were creating on the basis of their specialist knowledge.  They sustained their competitive 
advantage both through their special expertise and unique customer relations.  In brief, 
although ARM case has more evidences to support an opportunity creation, it does also 
feature attributes of opportunity discovery as well. 
We found that the most frequently used strategy for disruptive innovation cases is a 
leadership style based on expertise and experience and the sustaining of competitive 
advantage through tacit learning in a path dependent process (both scored 6 positives). 
Thus the entrepreneur’s prior knowledge (expertise or experience) about a certain market 
or industry may be critical for identifying prospects for DI. Likewise, the tacit learning in 
the process of cultivating DI can give rise to competitive advantage. The other much used 
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strategies are HR practices associated with opportunity discovery (specialist human 
capital recruited broadly), sustaining competitive advantage by means of speed, secrecy, 
and erecting entry barriers, and charismatic leadership (all score 5). This is consistent 
with the nature of disruptive innovation; most DIs are highly uncertain initially  
(targeting a new customer set) and hence charismatic leaders are essential to encourage 
the team to persist using trial and error processes in the market.  When DIs start to erode 
the mainstream market, conventional strategies such as speed, secrecy, and erecting entry 
barrier are needed to enable the entrants to survive often intense competition.  The 
frequency of recruitment of specialist human capital reflects the way most DI cases 
involve technological research and development.  
6. DISCUSSION 
A number of possible explanations could be offered for the lack of clear cut fit of these 
cases to one or the other categories of opportunity recognition and creation.  One 
explanation might be that the distinction between opportunity discovery and creation is 
unsound. Another is that the attributes associated with it in Tables 3 and 4 are 
inappropriate. The third possible explanation is that there is something distinctive about 
disruptive innovations and that these constitute a special and separate category in which 
there is overlapping opportunity discovery and creation. We now discuss each of these 
three explanations in detail. 
6.1 Our interpretation of the findings and of prior literature is that the distinction 
between opportunity discovery and creation is indeed of value, both conceptually and 
empirically. It is undoubtedly true that in some cases markets and technologies are 
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already available for those with the knowledge and acumen to recognize and exploit them. 
In other cases entrepreneurs have to create as yet unavailable opportunities by carrying 
out the function of “market makers” and complementary innovations must be mobilized 
to enable an opportunity to be realized even for a technology ready for use, while other 
technologies may need extensive development work.   
6.2 Since the distinction between opportunity discovery and creation is a useful one, it 
is necessary to consider whether the attributes assigned to these approaches to the pursuit 
of opportunity in Tables 3 and 4, are inappropriate. Barney and Alvarez derived their 
distinctions from specific theories of entrepreneurship and these therefore come into 
question.   We saw in the literature review that their dichotomy is consistent with that 
made by Sarasvathy (2001) between   allegedly classic causation theories of 
entrepreneurship and effectuation approaches. In the former, the entrepreneur engages in 
rational planning in order to achieve a pre-determined objective. In the latter, the 
entrepreneur has not identified a given opportunity to pursue, but is engaged in exploring 
possibilities that may or may not turn out to be opportunities; these have to be created by 
the effectuating entrepreneur (Sarasvathy, 2001).  
Sarasvathy does acknowledge that causation and effectuation processes ‘… can occur 
simultaneously, overlapping and intertwining over different contexts of decisions and 
actions… I deliberately juxtapose them as a dichotomy to enable a clearer theoretical 
exposition.” (Saravasy, 2001).  We submit that these “overlapping and intertwining 
aspects” have a confounding effect on empirical analysis. They make insufficient 
distinction 1) between entrepreneurial and corporate innovation and 2) they fail to take 
into account the way entrepreneurs approach means in creative and unplanned ways as 
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well as altering their objectives. 3) They are unsuited to explaining cases of disruptive 
innovation where discovery and creation processes are combined. 
6.2  The results reveal the distinctiveness of DI cases. While DI’s initially inferior 
performance features may help entrepreneurs to escape the radar of the incumbents, they 
also force entrepreneurs to develop new features that appeal to low-end market or new 
market customers. For example, Suzlon was not considered a threat to the wind turbine 
incumbents initially, but to attract  early customers Suzlon lowered prices and provided 
an integrated service. An opportunity for disruptive technological innovation may exist 
owing to advances in relevant technologies (e.g. for Seagate and ARM), convergence of  
technological advancements (e.g. Sony), and failure of previous R&D efforts or 
experiments (e.g. Tata Swach).   Discovery here required entrepreneurs’ expertise and 
experience. But entrepreneurs who are determined to explore the un-tapped markets, can 
make a pioneering move via trial-and-error processes (e.g. Suzlon, Luyuan, Tata Swach, 
and Sony).   Disruptive innovations   alter the terms of competition, make provision for 
new kinds of customer (as did all the cases discussed) and often challenge the market 
dominance of incumbent firms (as did Seagate with respect to other HDD firms and 
ARM with respect to Intel and other incumbent semi-conductor firms). These disruptive 
innovations were made possible because the entrepreneurs reconfigured their means-ends 
framework in terms of opportunities and the means to realize them. 
7. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The evidence and review of theory presented here implies a concept of entrepreneurial 
innovation different from that found in recent entrepreneurship literature.   
7.1 Corporate decision-making vs the ‘classic’ causation theory of entrepreneurship 
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Many of the attributes assigned to ‘classic’causation style decision making by 
entrepreneurs and to opportunity discovery are typical of methods viewed as best practice 
by and for corporate managers, as summarised by Stevenson (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1991). 
While rational planning can be expected to focus on securing appropriate means to 
achieve given ends, entrepreneurial innovators are likely to improvise means to achieve 
ends or alter their ends, or do both, in processes that may combine opportunity discovery 
and creation. The conceptualization is counter to the rational planning approach, where 
plans focus on securing resources as early as possible (“Investments and [preparatory] 
actions…typically follow the firm formation decision..”(Shah and Tripsas, 2007).  The 
‘classic’ or ‘causation’ theory of entrepreneurship presents a stylised form of rational 
planning. Thus Shah and Tripsas (2007) acknowledged that their depiction is a 
‘somewhat stylized account’ that ‘appears rational and calculated with roughly linear 
stages.” This is an ideal type without detailed empirical foundation, but  it has been 
attributed to entrepreneurs by a number of authors and treated on a par with accounts of 
entrepreneurship that are grounded in evidence (Alvarez and Barney, 2004; Fisher, 2012; 
Sarasvathy, 2001; Shah and Tripsas, 2007).   
When entrepreneurs turn to corporate planning processes for guidance they may use 
conventional project planning methods. But according to theories of entrepreneurship that 
also have a claim to being classic, these are not typically entrepreneurial forms of 
decision-making (see Eckhardt and Shane (2003); Freeman (1982), Penrose (1959), 
Stevenson and Jarillo (1991)).  It seems that the theoretical basis on which the 
Opportunity Discovery attributes are assigned by Barney and Alvarez in Tables 3 and 4 
does not recognize that the ‘classic’ theory of entrepreneurship (Shah and Tripsas, 2007) 
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actually describes the decision-making process long advocated for corporate managers 
(Simon and March, 1958).  
Corporate managers are not encouraged to alter the prevailing means-ends framework of 
their company (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). Instead they start with an identified 
opportunity (often selected through a formal discovery process) and plan to realize the 
opportunity using endorsed means, securing the necessary budget allocation and the 
human resources to make this possible. To take a particular effect as given and focus on 
“selecting between means to create that effect.” (Saranavasy, 2001) which has been 
described as classic entrepreneurial behaviour is actually a description of how corporate 
managers proceed once a goal has been approved by their hierarchy and they are seeking 
the most effective way of reaching it. When these methods are used in startups, for 
whatever reason, these are diverging from typically entrepreneurial innovation processes. 
7.2 Means and ends – the entrepreneurial calculus 
The entrepreneurs we studied re-ran their means-ends calculus according to the 
availability of resources and changing circumstances; creative use of means altered the 
chances of realizing opportunities. The evidence from the cases presented here shows 
that innovation results when entrepreneurs recognise the potential for both resources 
and opportunities to be pursued in new ways to create and capture value (Garnsey, 
1998). This was recognised by classic authors on entrepreneurship including Penrose 
(1960) and Freeman (1982), who wrote of innovation that results from “a matching 
process of new technology and new markets, guided by imaginative entrepreneurs”. 
The continual scanning and re-assessment of means and ends, of resources, processes 
and opportunities, is a key feature of entrepreneurial problem solving.  For example, 
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access by the entrepreneurs to the resources embodied in miniaturisation, wind energy 
technology, the e-bike, the RISC chip technology, etc., altered the means-ends 
possibilities for entrepreneurs and they took advantage of this to create value. They 
changed their means-ends calculus in response to new conditions whether they had 
control over a key resource or whether they had to find creative ways (means) to access 
resources needed to realise the opportunity. 
Effectuation theory recognizes the flexible and creative mode in which entrepreneurs tend 
to operate. Sarasvathy is justified in emphasizing that entrepreneurs engage in effectuation 
by building on who they are, what they know and who they know. Undoubtedly 
entrepreneurs are adept at gaining leverage from their knowledge and their networks and 
benefit greatly from doing so. But the attempt through effectuation theory to highlight an 
elegant distinction between the pursuit of given ends using optional means,  and the pursuit 
of optional ends using given means pre-empts a third possibility –the flexible pursuit by 
entrepreneurs of both ends and means. The entrepreneurs studied here did not make do with 
the resources at their disposal, as assumed in theories of effectuation and also of ‘bricolage’ 
(Baker and Nelson, 2005).  Instead they actively sought to extend and add to these personal 
and relational resources in pursuit of entrepreneurial objectives. This is consistent with 
theories of entrepreneurship that pre-date recent contributions. Entrepreneurs set out 
without the knowledge or resources they needed to realize an opportunity, as predicted by 
Stevenson (2006).   
For example, ARM targetted the mobile device market while lacking marketing resources 
of a conventional kind.  To get past this deficit they provided design and customer support 
services for key alliance partners who sold the end product into mobile device markets, 
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enabling ARM to gain royalties and licensing revenues from markets without undertaking 
conventional marketing expenditure.  Suzlon aimed to move into the wind energy sector 
without any of the knowledge required to be successful in this sector, but succeeded in 
allying with a German firm that could provide this knowledge, later buying this firm.  
Luyuan did not start out with the relational resources (networks) enabling them to influence 
government safety standards for e-bikes, but they deliberately cultivated and developed 
these network resources.  
In several of the case studies, goals or ends were reconfigured as the entrepreneurs 
proceeded. The pressures of necessity encouraged their inventiveness. Thus Suzlon started 
by seeking a reliable energy source for a textile business and moved their strategic goal to 
providing a new form of energy; ARM intended to subcontract the production of their 
RISC chips and instead developed an IP business model involving no sub-contracting. 
Luyuan started in E-bike business and went on to diversify into the battery business for E-
vehicles. 
Entrepreneurs can only act before they have control over resources because they 
reconfigure both means and ends to find new ways to innovate. “entrepreneurial decisions 
are creative decisions. That is, the entrepreneur creates the means, the ends or both. 
(Eckhardt and Shane, 2003)”.   In other words, for creative entrepreneurs means are not 
given (the resources at their disposal in bricolage), but, like ends, can be reconfigured in an 
interactive and iterative process of problem solving. 
Our evidence also qualifies the theory of entrepreneurial means and ends framework as 
presented in economic theory. “The creation of new means-ends frameworks in 
entrepreneurial decision making is a crucial part of the difference between entrepreneurial 
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opportunities and situations in which profit can be generated by optimizing within 
previously established means-ends frameworks..” (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). Economists 
who have addressed the role of entrepreneurs in the economy have focused on their 
recognition of deficient price signals and the improved resource allocation which results 
from their putting resources to better use in this way (Casson, 1982).   But our case studies 
show that the flexible means-ends calculus of the entrepreneur goes well beyond the 
reallocation of resources to a fixed set of goods and services through a creative response to 
pricing possibilities,  as assumed by these economists. Instead entrepreneurs are adept at 
creating new means (new resources), as when they develop new technologies which 
become means to the realization of new strategic goals or opportunities. Resource creation 
of this kind (creating new means) is demonstrated by Seagate, Sony, Suzlon, Luyuan and 
ARM.  Entrepreneurs are also adept at gaining leverage from such resources as are at their 
disposal, especially (as Sarasvathy correctly points out), from their knowledge and 
networks. They are adept at economizing on resources and at enlisting others to make 
available further resources in return for a share in the returns from new value creation   
(Hugo and Garnsey, 2004). 
7.3 Disruptive Innovations – Opportunity Recognition and Creation 
The process by which disruptive innovations  have taken place have represented par 
excellence cases of the reconfiguration of means and ends where entrepreneurs are taking 
decisions in conditions of uncertainty, with indefinite goals and limited resources. The 
entrepreneurs’ prior knowledge or experience about a given market or industry may be 
critical to recognising the opportunity for a disruptive technology, but at the same time 
strong elements of opportunity creation are required. The strategy is emergent, involving 
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market exploration as the entrepreneurs find out more about relevant business ecosystems. 
They come to recognize that they could meet the demands of a new set of customers 
without some of the product features expected by existing customers. They attempt by trial 
and error to bring down costs and improve performance on a range of product features.   
DI cases tend initially to be highly uncertain and charismatic leaders are needed at the head 
of entrepreneurial teams to pursue the opportunity via trial and error processes and to create 
the appropriate marketing mix (product, price, distribution channel, promotion and after 
sales services, etc). Such processes then yield tacit knowledge which can help sustain the 
competitive advantage of the company. 
In defense of the rational planning method associated with causation theories of 
entrepreneurship (Fisher, 2012; Sarasvathy, 2001), it should be recognized that while 
creative approaches to entrepreneurship are what enable a minority of firms to succeed, 
their ‘hit or miss’ nature is not without wasteful features. New businesses using such 
methods have very high rates of attrition. Venture capitalists who insist on conformity to 
rational planning milestones run the risk of preventing entrepreneurs from being responsive 
to unpredictable developments. The flexibility to change direction is greater for 
entrepreneurial than that for corporate innovators and has been demonstrated by many 
successful ventures. But Venture Capitalists may have good reasons to encourage the 
ventures in which they invest to select goals and identify feasible means to reach them by 
identifying promising markets and robust technologies. This systematic approach could be 
applied to the pursuit of purposive disruptive innovation. Once they have clearly identified 
unmet needs in a market with customers who require simpler, lower cost solutions to a 
widespread problem, entrepreneurs could set out to devise such solutions and construct a 
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disruptive innovation. In doing so they could learn both from orthodox corporate strategic 
process and from the improvisation approaches used by entrepreneurs, as described in our 
case studies. 
Discovery and Creation are not the inverse of each other but are orthogonal, and could be 
used in combination to realise Creation-Discovery opportunities.  We have illustrated the 
differences between these three categories using examples from developed markets 
(supercomputer and transistor), new examples from emerging markets ( a renewable energy 
supplier  and an e-bike supplier) together with an example of a case  that disrupted the 
established semiconductor market.  
Emerging markets will continue to offer many technological disruptive innovation 
opportunities to entrepreneurial firms because there is high aggregate demand for good-
enough products/services which are also affordable to the customers in the bottom of the 
pyramid (Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998). Many MNCs have started to pay attention as the 
growth potential of emerging markets could not only compensate for the persistent 
slowdown in advanced markets, but are also likely to create reverse innovation candidates 
to stimulate new markets in the near future (Immelt, et al., 2009).    
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